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Abstract 
At first, this paper examines the association between managerial entrenchment and corporate leverage in French 
case. Then, the effect of free cash flow in this relationship is investigated. Using a sample of 98 listed French 
companies in Euronext Paris from 2000 to 2014, it was found that CEO entrenchment is related positively to 
debt before financial crisis and negatively after crisis. Also, free cash flow moderates the relationship between 
CEO entrenchment and corporate debt before crisis. 
Keywords: CEO Entrenchment- Debt- Free Cash-Flow- moderator variable  
 
1. Introduction 
The manager’s entrenchment is considered as an active behavior of the CEO who seeks to keep his position in 
the company. A manager pursues some entrenchment strategies; The CEO focuses to invest on specific assets 
which are related to his training even if the investments are not profitable for the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989). The CEO can also manipulate information by omitting some information and advance information which 
gives value to his human capital (Stiglitz et Eldin, 1992). On the other hand, Pigé (1998) considers that to be a 
member of a relational network can help the CEO to be more entrenched. To have a relationship with 
administrators (Pichard-Stamford, 1998) or with shareholders (Paquerot, 1997) allows CEOs to have more 
control and power of the board. 
Through those strategies, the CEO seeks to overcome control mechanism. This article focuses 
specifically on debt which CEO entrenchment avoids his disciplining role. 
Many studies were examined with the relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt in several 
contexts of the world, and specifically in countries where the corporate governance system is an outsider 
(notably Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997: USA; De Jong and Veld, 2001: Netherland; Bunkanwanicha, Gupta 
and Rokhim, 2008: Thailand and Indonisia; Pokharel, 2013: Nepal). It was noticed that such research is rare in 
countries where companies are characterized by concentrated ownership or control (insider systems). To our 
knowledge, there is one study that examines the relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt (Paquerot and 
Chapuis, 2006). In their study, authors consider CEO entrenched only when he belongs to network ex-student of 
National School of Administration (ENA)
1
.  
The current study tries to answer the question if CEO entrenchment and debt are related negatively in a 
French context and whether free cash flow affects this relationship. 
Using a sample of 98 listed French companies from 2000 to 2014, the aims of this research are to 
develop a panel model to investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on leverage ratio and the effect of 
free cash flow on this relationship. 
By comparing the situation before and after financial crisis, the results show that managerial 
entrenchment is positively related by leverage before financial crisis. On the other side, the same relationship is 
negative and confirms the empirical evidence that firms with stronger managerial control power tend to use less 
debt (Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997) after crisis. Free cash flow moderates negatively the relationship 
between entrenched manager and leverage only before crisis.   
Results show differences in regards to the relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt before 
and after crisis.   
The empirical analysis of this study has two goals. First, four models will be tested. Every model 
represents the association between entrenchment’s proxy and debt. Second, the effect of free cash flow as a 
moderator variable in the relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt will be explored. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 the literature review. The third section 
presents sample and data. The fourth section provides the empirical model and variables measurement. The fifth 
section exhibits findings. The conclusions are given in section 6.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 ENA : Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
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2. Literature review   
2.1 Managerial entrenchment and Leverage 
According to agency theory, there exists conflict of interest between managers and shareholders over capital 
structure decision. Managers prefer less debt because they seek lower firm risk to protect their human capital 
(Fama, 1980). 
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) studied the effect of managerial entrenchment on leverage in an 
American context. It was found that the level of corporate debt depends on the degree of managerial 
entrenchment. The first results of this research indicate that the CEO seeks to avoid debt. The authors then went 
on to test the effect of tender offer on the studied relationship. They found that the level of debt changes. 
However, leverage increases significantly to push tender offers. 
For Gamble (2000), a low debt on total assets ratio reduces the need to cover fixed costs and increase 
manager’s opportunism (Weir and Jones, 1999). An entrenched manager tries to avoid debt to escape 
stakeholder’s control and thus to blend his power in the firm.  
De Jong and Veld (2001) show, in their study, those managers of Dutch companies are entrenched and 
have flexibility on financial decisions. The authors conclude that managers decrease the level of leverage to 
avoid the disciplining role of debt. 
Lee and Yeo (2010) find that firms with higher CEO entrenchment have lower levels of leverage of 
Asian firms. They confirm that entrenched CEO of Asian firms prefer lower levels of debt to avoid monitoring 
allied by debt financing. 
Pokhrel (2013) tests the effect of CEO entrenchment on the level of leverage on Nepalese firms. 
According to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Pokharel (2013) establishes an index of governance that shows 
the level of entrenchment. Pokharel (2013) concludes that the relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt 
in Nepal is negative but not significant. 
In this regard, the manager seeks to avoid debt financing and prefers equity financing. In this case, 
when CEO entrenchment increases, leverage decreases. 
The first hypothesis is  
H1: Managerial entrenchment is negatively related (or associated) to leverage 
This first hypothesis is divided into four sub hypotheses according to four chosen items of 
entrenchment: 
H1.1: Age of manager is negatively related to leverage  
H1.2: When manager is CEO and director of the board, the level of leverage decreases. 
H1.3: CEO’s stock ownership is negatively related to leverage. 
H1.4: Relationship network’s manager is negatively related to leverage 
 
2.2 The effect of Free Cash Flow  
Free cash flow is defined as cash flow in excess of that required funding all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen, 1986). When the firm generates free cash 
flow, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers increase. The problem is how to affect this 
resource to motivate managers not to make over-investment that causes a destruction of shareholder value 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
To reduce agency costs, Jensen (1986) suggests debt as an important mechanism to control 
opportunistic behavior of leaders. In fact, debt limits the managerial discretion by reducing the amount of free 
cash flow. The discipline of the debt means that managers invest on efficient projects to refund borrowing and 
therefore, create value for shareholders.   
Poincelot (1999) examined the role of debt to control manager’s behavior when companies generate a 
free cash flow in French case. Empirical results provide that debt is not an efficient mechanism of control 
(contrary to free cash flow theory) but rather a variable manipulated by managers. 
Lee and Yeo (2010) tested the relationship between managerial entrenchment and capital structure of 
Asian firms. They found that manager entrenchment and corporate leverage are negatively related. This 
association appears when firms have a higher agency cost of free cash flow. 
In this respect, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
H2: Free cash flow moderates negatively the relationship between CEO entrenchment and leverage.  
 
3. Sample and data 
The population for this study is 98 listed companies on Euronext Paris from 2000 to 2014. Financial variables 
are collected from Datstream data base. Governance data are obtained from Dasfsaliens database and “Guide des 
Etats Majors” and company websites. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 
are excluded from the sample, because there are differences in leverage and corporate governance between those 
industries and other sectors. 
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4. Model 
To test the hypotheses, multivariate linear regression model was used. Statistical methods used are panel data 
approach. Data analysis software utilized in this study is STATA 13. 
Five models are defined in the following table:  
Table 1. Regression models  
Hypothesis Regression Model 
H.1.1 RATENDit= β0+β1AGEDIRit+ β2 SIZEit+ β3 ROEit+  β4 ROAit+ β5 SECit+ εit. M1 
H.1.2 RATENDit= β0 +β1CUMULit+ β2SIZEit+ β3ROEit + β4ROAit + β5SECit + εit. M2 
H.1.3 RATENDit= β0 +β1 ACTIDit+ β2SIZEit + β3ROEit + β4ROAit + β5SECit + εit. M3 
H.1.4 RATENDit= β0 +β1 RESDIRit+ β2 SIZEit + β3 ROEit + β4 ROAit + β5 SECit + εit. M4 
H.2 RATENDit= β0 + a ACTIDit+ b FCFit+ c ACTID*FCFit+ β1SIZEit+ β2ROEit+ 
β3ROAit+ β4SECit+ εit. 
M5 
Where:  
RATEND  Leverage is measured by total debt on total assets ratio (Berger and al.1997, Gamble, 2000). 
AGEDIR  is dummy variable that takes the value ‘0’ when the CEO’s age < 60 years and ‘1’ otherwise. 
CUMUL  is dummy variable that takes the value ‘0’ when the CEO and the director of the board are the same 
person and ‘1’ otherwise. 
ACTID  CEO’s stock ownership= Shares owned directly. 
RESDIR  is dummy variable that takes the value ‘0’ when the CEO is an ex-student of National School of 
Administration or Polytechnic School ‘X’ and ‘1’ otherwise. 
ROA    Return on assets: (Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation)/total assets. 
ROE    Return on equity: Net income/Shareholder’s equity. 
SIZE    Company size   Log (total assets).  
SEC    Type of industries 
FCF    operating income before depreciation after deducting payments for taxes, interest expense and dividends 
paid to shareholders (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 exhibits descriptive statistics of different variables used in the analysis. Results reveal that level of debt, 
before crisis, on average is higher than after crisis one. CEO’s stock ownership (ACTID) does not change before 
and after crisis. Average rate of firm’s size is 11.803 before crisis and 12.161 after crisis.  Average rate of return 
on assets does not change before and after crisis. Average rate of return on equity is 0.049 before crisis and 0.019 
after crisis. FCF before crisis is higher than FCF after crisis. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Mean Sd Min  Max Mean Sd Min  Max 
RATEND 0.208 0.272 0 3.218 0.194 0.216 0 2.713 
ACTID 0.124 0.202 0 0.941 0.126 0.203 0 0.94 
SIZE 11.803 2.59 6.448 18.58 12.161 2.634 6.448 19.044 
ROA 0.274 0.122 -0.788 0.55 0.201 0.866 -0.557 0.376 
ROE 0.049 0.221 -0.981 0.836 0.019 0.188 -0.944 0.566 
FCF 0.024 0.924 -0.586 1.383 -0.09 0.416 -3.073 1.594 
 
Table 3. Cross table AGEDIR/CUMUL (Before crisis) 
 
AGEDIR 
CUMUL Total 
0 1  
 
0 
608 109 717 
68.93 12.35 
 
1 
148 17 165 
16.78 1.927 
 756 126 882 
85.714 14.285 
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Table 4. Cross table AGEDIR/CUMUL (after crisis) 
 
AGEDIR 
CUMUL Total 
0 1  
 
0 
310 60 370 
52.72 10.2 
 
1 
196 22 218 
33.333 3.741 
 506 82 588 
86.054 13.945 
Tables 3and 4 show that 85.714% (86.054%) of managers have accumulation of responsibilities and 
16.78% (33.33%) are above retirement age. So CEO’s entrenchment accumulates responsibilities, before or after 
crisis, can justify his presence in company above retirement age (Paquerot, 1997). 
Table 5. Cross table AGEDIR/RESDIR (Before crisis) 
 
AGEDIR 
RESDIR Total 
0 1  
 
0 
145 572 717 
16.439 64.852 
 
1 
42 123 165 
4.761 13.945 
 187 695 882 
21.201 78.798 
 
Table 6. Cross table AGEDIR/RESDIR (after crisis) 
 
AGEDIR 
RESDIR Total 
0 1  
 
0 
73 297 370 
12.414 50.51 
 
1 
47 171 218 
7.993 29.081 
 120 468 588 
20.408 79.591 
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that 21.201% (20.408%) of French managers studied in ENA or X-Mines 
of which 4.761% (7.993%) are above retirement age. 
Table 7. Cross table CUMUL/RESDIR (Before crisis) 
 
CUMUL 
RESDIR Total 
0 1  
 
0 
145 611 756 
16.439 69.274 
 
1 
42 84 126 
4.761 9.523 
 187 695 882 
21.201 78.798 
 
Table 8. Cross table CUMUL/RESDIR (after crisis) 
 
CUMUL 
RESDIR Total 
0 1  
 
0 
104 402 506 
17.687 68.367 
 
1 
16 66 82 
7.993 29.081 
 120 468 588 
20.408 79.591 
Tables 7 and 8 provide that 21.201% (20.408%) of French managers studied in ENA or X-Mines of 
which 16.439% (17.687%) accumulate responsibilities. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.2, 2017 
 
81 
Table9. Non-parametric test for relationship between ACTID, AGEDIR, CUMUL and RESDIR. 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 G1 (0) G2 (0) Z sig G1 (0) G2 (0) Z sig 
AGEDIR 321623 67780 1.785 0.0742 107671.5 65494.5 -0.684 0.494 
CUMUL 344269.5 45133.5 4.121 0.000 153043.5 20122.5 2.967 0.0003 
RESDIR 71675 317728 -3.659 0.0003 33100.5 140065.5 -1.419 0.156 
It was identified that ACTID is not normal, therefore a Mann Whitney test was used to present the 
relationship between ACTID, AGEDIR, CUMUL and RESDIR. 
Table 9 shows, before crisis, that CEO’s stock ownership depends on manager’s age. In fact, the 
manager who is under retirement age has more stocks than the manager who is below retirement age. CEO’s 
stock ownership depends on manager’s education. When manager has studied in National School of 
Administration or Polytechnic School, he has a lot of stocks. CEO’s stock ownership depends, also, on 
responsibilities accumulated by manager. When manager is director of the board and CEO, he possesses a lot of 
stocks. 
On the other hand, after crisis, the table shows that CEO’s stock ownership depends only on 
responsibilities accumulated by manager. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 10. Correlation matrix 
 Before crisis  After crisis  
 ACTID FCF SIZE ROA ROE ACTID FCF SIZE ROA ROE 
ACTID 1     1     
FCF 0.066 1    0.043 1    
SIZE -0.303 -0.06 1   -0.302 -0.085 1   
ROA 0.025 0.243 0.138 1  0.089 -0.166 0.238 1  
ROE -0.006 0.189 0.233 0.728
***
 1 0.106 -0.165 0.271 0.782
***
 1 
Note: ***signification 1% 
Table 10 presents a correlation matrix between independent and control variables. It shows that for all 
relations, the coefficients are significant. Managerial entrenchment is positively and significantly related to free 
cash flow and return on assets, before and after crisis. However, managerial entrenchment is negatively and 
significantly associated with the size of the firm, in the two cases. On the other hand, CEO entrenchment is 
negatively and significantly related to return on equity after crisis. But, after crisis, CEO entrenchment is positive 
and significant related to return on equity. 
Table 11. Results multivariate regression: Model 1 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
AGEDIR -0.010 0.334 0.002 0.556 
SIZE 0.019 0.000 0.010 0.000 
ROA -0.122 0.001 -0.216 0.002 
ROE -0.039 0.012 -0.007 -0.073 
SEC 0.075 0.000 0.074 0.000 
Constant -0.078 0.005 0.038 0.074 
It can be seen, in Table 11, that age of manager has no significant effect on level of debt, before and 
after crisis. The first hypothesis is thus rejected. It can be concluded that corporate leverage does not depend on 
age of manager (under or over retirement age).  
Table12. Results multivariate regression: Model 2 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
CUMUL -0.001 0.947 -0.038 0.005 
SIZE 0.019 0.000 0.011 0.000 
ROA -0.118 0.001 -0.261 0.003 
ROE -0.038 0.014 -0.009 0.781 
SEC 0.075 0.000 0.073 0.000 
Constant -0.081 0.004 0.023 0.286 
From this table, it can be seen that CUMUL has a negative but not significant effect on the level of 
debt, before crisis. But CUMUL has a significant and negative effect on the level of debt, after crisis. From this, 
H1.2 can be confirmed only after crisis. When manager is CEO and director of board, he has power and can 
choose decisions concerning capital structure, so he tends to avoid debt to increase stockholder’s control (Gul 
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and Wah, 2002). 
Table13.Results multivariate regression: Model 3 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
ACTID 0.077 0.036 -0.092 0.000 
SIZE 0.019 0.000 0.008 0.000 
ROA -0.110 0.002 -0.258 0.003 
ROE -0.040 0.009 -0.008 0.801 
SEC 0.082 0.000 0.067 0.000 
Constant -0.094 0.001 0.076 0.002 
Table 13 illustrates that the coefficient is positive and significant, before crisis. This positive 
relationship may be explained by the fact that the highly CEO ownership gives CEO more powerful incentives to 
make value-maximizing decisions about capital structure (Berger and al, 1997). In this case, debt is not an 
efficient control mechanism. 
After crisis, it can be seen that CEO ownership is negatively and significant associated to leverage. 
These results corroborate those of Kammoun and Boujelbène (2012), who demonstrated that there is a negative 
relationship between CEO ownership and debt for American firms. 
Table14.Results multivariate regression: Model 4 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
RESDIR 0.043 0.003 0.008 0.435 
SIZE 0.019 0.000 0.010 0.000 
ROA -0.106 0.004 -0.272 0.002 
ROE -0.040 0.010 -0.001 0.972 
SEC 0.073 0.000 0.072 0.000 
Constant -0.115 0.000 0.025 0.270 
Table 14 does not confirm that managerial entrenchment is related negatively to debt. Indeed, a 
positive and significant coefficient was found between RESDIR and RATEND. These results corroborate those 
of Chapuis and Paquerot (2006). French CEO’s who belong to relational network of older students of National 
School of Administration or Polytechnic School opt for debt. In fact, they have advantages when they borrow 
from big business bank because those banks are colonized by members of the same relational network. 
It can be concluded that CEO entrenchment is positively related to debt before crisis. This result can be 
explained by the higher level of debt according to bank. In this case, debt is not an efficient control mechanism, 
but a way for CEO’s to entrench and increase their power. 
After crisis, it was found that CEO entrenchment is associated negatively with debt. It appears logical, 
because after subprime crisis CEO avoid financing debt. Moreover, banks are in bankruptcy and cannot lend as 
usual firms.  
As for the control variables, and for all tables above, it was found that the coefficient of firm size is 
positive and significant before and after crisis. This reflects that larger firms have a higher level of debt. 
Concerning return on assets, tables show that the coefficient is negative and significant; but, return on equity is 
not all the time negative and significant. 
Table15.Results multivariate regression: Model 5 
 Before crisis After crisis 
 Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
ACTID 0.089 0.023 -0.091 0.000 
FCF -0.099 0.008 0.014 0.001 
ACTID*FCF -0.417 0.021 -0.002 0.923 
SIZE 0.020 0.000 0.008 0.000 
ROA -0.904 0.016 -0.293 0.001 
ROE -0.033 0.034 0.010 0.762 
SEC 0.061 0.001 0.065 0.000 
Constant -0.103 0.001 0.072 0.002 
ACTID*FCF has a negative and significant effect on the relationship between CEO entrenchment and 
leverage, before crisis. After crisis, FCF has a negative but not significant effect on the relationship between 
CEO entrenchment and leverage. Hence, free cash flow moderates negatively the relationship between CEO 
entrenchment and leverage, only before crisis. 
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6. Conclusion  
Using a sample of 98 French listed firms that belong to the Euronext Paris, over the period 2000 to 2014, it was 
found that CEO entrenchment positively affects debt before crisis. In other word, debt is not an efficient control 
mechanism; it is the CEO’s choice (Zweibel, 1996; John and Litov, 2010). After crisis, the relationship is 
different and becomes negative. Indeed, banks have problems of liquidity so they decrease the level of debt 
according to firms. 
The current finding also confirms that free cash flow can moderate negatively the relationship between 
CEO entrenchment and debt, before crisis. In fact, French managers choose to use firm’s resources to invest in 
profitable projects. 
This paper contributes to existing literature by studying the moderator effect of free cash flow on the 
relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt.  
The results and implications of this research are subject to several limitations that suggest future 
research. Firstly, due to difficulties in collecting data, the sample size of the research is relatively small compared 
to their studies examining CEO entrenchment. Future research could be benefit from using a larger sample when 
data becomes more readily available. Secondly, the research did not include all factors that may influence the 
relationship between CEO entrenchment and debt. Thus, future research may include governance variable such 
as audit committee. 
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